Market power and transferable property rights by Hahn, Robert W.
  
Market Power and Transferable Property Rights
Author(s): Robert W. Hahn
Source: The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 99, No. 4 (Nov., 1984), pp. 753-765
Published by: Oxford University Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1883124
Accessed: 04-10-2017 22:36 UTC
 
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide
range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and
facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
 
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
http://about.jstor.org/terms
Oxford University Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access
to The Quarterly Journal of Economics
This content downloaded from 131.215.23.153 on Wed, 04 Oct 2017 22:36:02 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 MARKET POWER AND TRANSFERABLE PROPERTY
 RIGHTS*
 ROBERT W. HAHN
 The appeal of using markets as a means of allocating scarce resources stems
 in large part from the assumption that a market will approximate the competitive
 ideal. When competition is not a foregone conclusion, the question naturally arises
 as to how a firm might manipulate the market to its own advantage. This paper
 analyzes the issue of market power in the context of markets for transferable
 property rights. First, a model is developed that explains how a single firm with
 market power might exercise its influence. This is followed by an examination of
 the model in the context of a particular policy problem-the control of particulate
 sulfates in the Los Angeles region.
 I. INTRODUCTION
 The idea of implementing a market to ration a given quantity
 of resources is by no means novel. Working examples include
 markets for taxi medallions and liquor licenses. Suggested ap-
 plications for the use of a market approach abound in the eco-
 nomics literature, especially in the fields of air and water pol-
 lution.' Why has the idea of setting up a market in transferable
 property rights received so much attention? One key reason, and
 the reason which motivates this paper, is that such markets have
 the potential to achieve a given objective in a cost-effective man-
 ner. Whether this potential is realized depends, among other things,
 on the design of the market and the extent to which individual
 firms can exert a significant influence on the market.
 The purpose of this paper will be to explore how the initial
 distribution of property rights can lead to inefficiencies. Section
 II develops the basic model for the case in which one firm can
 influence the market. Section III considers a potential application
 of the model. The results of the theoretical analysis are then
 *The work reported here was supported by the Environmental Quality Lab-
 oratory at Caltech and the California Air Resources Board. I would like to thank
 Jim Quirk, Roger Noll, Jennifer Reinganum, and Robert Dorfman for providing
 helpful comments. The views expressed herein, including any remaining errors,
 are solely the responsibility of the author.
 1. Tietenberg [1980] provides a comprehensive survey of the application of
 marketable permits to the control of stationary source air pollution. A general
 list of references to potential applications in air and water pollution is provided
 in the study by Anderson et al. [1979].
 ? 1984 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College. Published by John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
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 compared with the conventional wisdom, and directions for future
 research are discussed in Section IV.
 For analytical purposes, firms are divided into two categories.
 A firm will be said to have market power if it realizes it has an
 influence on price. A firm will not have market power if it acts
 as a price taker. The question for analysis, then, is how a single
 firm with market power might influence the market by affecting
 the price at which a commodity sells. More precisely, this essay
 examines how the price strategy of a firm with market power
 varies with changes in the initial distribution of property rights.
 In the static models developed below, all transactions take
 place at a single price. Restricting the model in this way permits
 analysis of a range of inefficient outcomes. This is in contrast to
 the approach taken by Coase [1960] in his seminal article, who
 does not restrict the bargaining space and, consequently, empha-
 sizes the range of efficient outcomes that can result, irrespective
 of the initial endowment of property rights.
 The principal result is that the degree of inefficiency observed
 in the market is systematically related to the distribution of per-
 mits. For the case of one firm with market power, the results have
 some intuitive appeal. If a firm with market power would elect
 to buy permits in a competitive market (i.e., where all firms act
 as if they were price takers), then it follows a strategy resembling
 that of a monopsonist. If it would choose to sell permits in a
 competitive market, then the firm with market power follows a
 strategy resembling that of a monopolist. These results are for-
 malized in the next section.
 II. THE BASIC MODEL
 A critical assumption underlying the competitive model is
 that firms act as if they were price takers. In the model developed
 below, it will be assumed that all firms except one are price takers.
 The basic question to be answered is how (and whether) the equi-
 librium price and quantities will vary as a function of the initial
 distribution of permits among firms.
 Consider the case of m firms with firm 1 designated as the
 firm with market power. A total of L permits are distributed to
 the firms, with the ith firm receiving Q? permits. Firms are al-
 lowed to trade permits in a market that lasts for one period. The
 number of permits that the ith firm has after trading will be
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 denoted by Qi. All firms except the market power firm are assumed
 to have downward sloping inverse demand functions for permits
 of the form Pi(Q) over the region [O,L]. Pi represents firm i's
 willingness to pay. All trades in the market are constrained to
 take place at a single equilibrium price P. For concreteness, we
 shall consider the case of a classical pollution externality. All
 price-taking firms attempt to minimize the sum of abatement
 costs and permit costs. For the case of pollution, the assumption
 of downward sloping demand curves is equivalent to the as-
 sumption that marginal abatement costs are increasing. Let C-(Qi)
 be the abatement cost associated with emitting Qi units. Marginal
 abatement costs, - C', are assumed to be positive and increasing,
 which implies that C' < 0 and C" > 0 for i = 2, . . . , m. Price tak-
 ers solve the following optimization problem:
 (1) minimize C (Qi) + P(Q, - Q?) (i = 2, . .. , m).
 Qi
 The first-order condition for an interior solution is
 (2) Ci(Qi) + P = 0.
 This merely says that price takers will adjust the quantity used
 Q, until the marginal abatement cost equals the equilibrium price
 P.2 Equation (2) implicitly defines a demand function Qi(P), which
 is downward sloping on [0,L] for i = 2,. .. , m. Furthermore, note
 that the number of permits the ith price-taking firm will use is
 independent of its initial allocation of permits.
 The analysis of the firm with market power is less straight-
 forward. Begin by defining an abatement cost function C1(Qi),
 where C1 < 0 and C1 > 0. This says that the firm with market
 power faces increasing marginal abatement costs. Firm 1 has the
 power to pick a price that will minimze its expenditure on abate-
 ment costs and permits subject to the constraint that the market
 clear. Formally, the problem is to
 minimize Ci(Qi) + P(Q1 - Q?)
 (3) P
 subject to Qi = L - I Qi(P).
 i=2
 2. The assumption of increasing marginal abatement cost implies that the
 firm attains a regular minimum in solving the problem.
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 Substituting the constraint into the objective function and dif-
 ferentiating yield the following first-order condition for an inte-
 rior minimum:
 m m
 (4) (- C1 -P) EQi+ L_-EQ()- ?0=O
 i =2 i= 2
 Equation (4) reveals that the only case in which the marginal
 cost of abatement - C1 will equal the equilibrium price is when
 firm l's distribution of permits just equals the amount it chooses
 to use. In effect, this says that the only way to achieve a cost-
 effective solution, where marginal abatement costs are equal for
 all firms, is to pick an initial distribution of permits for firm 1
 which coincides with the cost-minimizing solution.
 This gives rise to the following result:
 PROPOSITION 1. Suppose that there is one firm with market power.
 If it does not receive an amount of permits equal to the num-
 ber that it holds in equilibrium, then the total expenditure
 on abatement will exceed the cost-minimizing solution.
 The key point to be gleaned from the analysis is that the distri-
 bution of permits matters, with regard not only to equity consid-
 erations but also to cost. Traditional models of such markets view
 problems of permit distribution as being strictly an equity issue.3
 With the introduction of market power, it was shown that the
 distribution of permits may also impinge on efficiency consider-
 ations.
 The next logical question to explore is how the market equi-
 librium will vary as a function of firm l's initial distribution of
 permits. Doing the necessary comparative statics yields
 (5) '3Q= - C1 - P) E Q'
 L = constant
 m m
 + E Qi=2C - 2 E Q1
 i=2 i~~=2
 3. The analysis by Montgomery [1972] is one such example. In this analysis
 firms are assumed to be price takers. For the case of one pollutant, one market,
 and a linear relationship between source emissions and environmental quality,
 Montgomery finds that the distribution of permits will have no effect on achieving
 the target in a cost-effective manner.
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 The expression for the denominator is the second-order condition
 for the cost minimization and will be positive if the second-order
 sufficiency condition for a minimum obtains. For example, in the
 case of linear demand curves (i.e., Q. = 0), the expression will be
 positive. Thus, for the case when a regular interior minimum
 exists, a transfer of permits from any of the price takers to the
 firm with market power will result in an increase in the equilib-
 rium price. An immediate corollary to this result is that the num-
 ber of permits that the firm with market power uses will increase
 as its initial allocation of permits is increased. Formally, the
 problem is to show (aQ1/Q?) > 0. By the chain rule,
 (6) dQ- dQi dP
 aQ? adP aQT
 It suffices to show that (aQ1/dP) is positive. By direct substitution
 for Qj,
 foYtL - 2m Qi(P))
 (7) PQP
 The expression on the right-hand side of (7) equals -1'7' 2Q(P),
 which is positive, because demand curves are presumed to be
 negatively sloped.
 One question that arises in this model is whether there is
 any systematic relationship between the distribution of permits
 to the firm with market power and the degree of inefficiency. If
 inefficiency is measured by the extent to which abatement costs
 exceed the minimum required to reach a stated target, then it is
 possible to show the following result:
 PROPOSITION 2. Let Q* denote the distribution of permits for the
 case when permit distribution equals permit use for the firm
 with market power. Then inefficiency increases both as Q1
 increases above Q* and as Q? decreases below Q*.
 The proposition is verified by determining how total cost TC var-
 ies as a function of Q1.
 The efficient solution is derived from the following minimi-
 zation:
 m
 (8) minimize TC = C1(Ql) + E Ci(Qi)
 Ql,..., Qn i=2
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 subject to
 m
 Qi + > Qi=L.
 L2
 First-order conditions imply that
 (9) -Ci(Qi) = Pi(Qi) = P (i = 2, . .. , m).
 Differentiation of total cost with respect to Q? yields
 TC = C' dQ + E CdQi
 aQo aQ0 aQo ?Q? i=2
 (10) mC + E Cm
 i=2 1 =1
 =E(Ci - CO)dQ
 The above expression can be simplified by noting that
 (11) dQ? = -dQ?/aa
 Equation (11) is obtained by differentiating (9) with respect to
 Q?. Substituting equation (11) into (10) yields
 aTC P m (C - CO)
 (12= aP m P - Cv)
 (12) dQ? iE2 C
 = d ? (P +C1) E C"
 Equation (12) implies that
 aTC
 (13) >TC, (<) 0 as (P + C1) > (<) 0.
 Combining (13) with equation (4) yields the result that total cost
 achieves a minimum at Q* and will increase as the permit dis-
 tribution deviates from Q* in either direction.
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 III. A POTENTIAL APPLICATION
 In order to apply the basic model described in the previous
 section, it is necessary to develop an operational test for identi-
 fying a firm with market power. How this might be done is beyond
 the scope of this paper. In the application discussed below, the
 firm holding the largest share of permits under a competitive
 market simulation is designated as the market power firm.
 To demonstrate how the basic model can be applied, the prob-
 lem of controlling particulate sulfates in the Los Angeles region
 was selected. This problem was chosen because it appeared to be
 a likely candidate for a transferable property rights scheme, and
 because the problem of market power could conceivably arise.
 Market simulations based on the assumption that firms are price
 takers indicate that the largest emitter of sulfur oxides, an electric
 utility, could account for as much as half of the total emissions,
 and an even higher proportion of emissions for which abatement
 technologies are known-i.e., controllable emissions.4
 The extent of market power will in general, vary with the
 level of allowable emissions, the shape of the marginal abatement
 cost schedule for the market power firm, and the marginal abate-
 ment costs faced by all other firms. For this particular example,
 a permit will be defined as the right to emit one ton of sulfur
 oxides emissions per day for one day. Based on this definition,
 Figure I shows the marginal costs of abatement for the firm des-
 ignated as the market power firm.5 Two curves are drawn in
 Figure I, a discrete step function (based on the data in Hahn
 [1981b]), and a continuous approximation that has the following
 functional form:
 (14) - C1 = 88,3OOQ17087.
 Actually, for the case of the market power firm, a continuous
 approximation is probably more reasonable because the abate-
 ment strategy under consideration is the desulfurization of fuel
 oil or the purchase of lower sulfur residual fuel oil.
 A similar graph for all other firms is shown in Figure II,
 which illustrates the derived demand for permits at any given
 4. A more detailed discussion of the market power question can be found in
 Hahn [1981a], and Hahn and Noll [1982].
 5. Further assumptions underlying the development of these data, such as
 the availability of natural gas, are discussed in Hahn [1981a].
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 FIGURE I
 Marginal Abatement Costs for Market Power Firm
 price. The continuous approximation to the discrete case takes
 the following form:
 (15) E Qi(P) = 73+ 1
 i=2 P.
 The demand curve is based on some discrete technologies such as
 scrubbers as well as some continuous abatement strategies such
 as the one mentioned above. The continuous approximation will
 be used for purposes of illustration. Note that the particular form
 used in (15) implies that emissions by others will be at least 73
 tons per day for all positive permit prices.
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 FIGURE II
 Derived Demand for Permits by All Other Firms
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 FIGURE III
 Permit Use versus Permit Distribution-Market Power
 To compute how the initial distribution of permits affects
 prices, quantities, and overall abatement, it is first necessary to
 select a value for the total number of permits. In this example
 the parameter L was set equal to 149 tons/day, an amount which
 will ensure that both state and federal standards related to sulfur
 oxides emissions and particulate sulfates will be met. Having
 chosen a value for L, we find it possible to examine how permit
 use varies with initial distribution by substituting equations (14)
 and (15) into equation (4) and solving. The graphical solution to
 the problem is shown in Figure III. Note that Q, increases as a
 function of Q? until a corner solution is approached. This point
 corresponds to a permit distribution where all other firms receive
 an amount of permits that just equals their uncontrollable emis-
 sions. If all other firms receive an amount of permits that falls
 short of their uncontrollable emissions, then the relationship be-
 tween Q, and Q? is not unique. In this latter case, the market
 power firm can reap infinite rewards by exploiting the perfectly
 inelastic part of the demand curve.6
 Prices vary widely as a function of the initial distribution of
 permits. The monopsony price is approximately $3,200/ton, while
 the competitive price, associated with Q? = 36, is about $3,900/
 ton.7 When all other firms receive permits corresponding to their
 uncontrollable emissions, the price of a permit jumps to approx-
 imately $21,000/ton. The monopoly price, i.e., when Q? = L, is
 not well defined both in theory and in practice: in theory, because
 6. In practice, such rewards would be limited by the decision of other firms
 to shut down operations.
 7. All prices and costs are given in 1977 dollars.
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 FIGURE IV
 Total Annual Abatement Cost versus Initial Distribution
 (15) is a hyperbola with an asymptote; and in practice, because
 of insufficient information on the value of firms and possible tech-
 nologies that might be available for controlling so-called uncon-
 trollable emissions.
 Given permit use as a function of the initial distribution of
 permits, it is then possible to estimate the total annual costs of
 abatement by integrating equations (14) and (15). The relation-
 ship between total annual abatement expenditures and the initial
 distribution of permits is shown in Figure IV. Note that abate-
 ment expenditures remain relatively constant (in the neighbor-
 hood of 490 million dollars annually) until the market power firm
 is able to exert some monopoly power when it receives permits
 in excess of 60 tons per day.
 The relative importance of monopolistic and monopsonistic
 behavior may be quite sensitive to parameter changes. In this
 case, monopsonistic behavior does not appear to present a prob-
 lem. The reason is that in the range of the competitive equilibrium
 for emissions limits around this stringent standard, the supply
 of permits from other firms to the largest source is very sensitive
 to price changes. This undermines the opportunity of the firm
 with market power to take advantage of its high market share.
 As the emissions ceiling is relaxed, inefficiencies resulting from
 monopsonistic behavior tend to increase.
 If the primary objective in setting up a market is to minimize
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 total abatement costs, Figure IV indicates that the policymaker
 should try to avoid a situation where the firm with market power
 can act as a monopolist. However, because of the uncertainty
 associated with the cost data, it makes sense to try to minimize
 the likelihood that a firm or group of firms will be able to induce
 a price-quantity equilibrium which departs from the competitive
 result in either direction. Alternatives for dealing with this issue
 are discussed in Hahn and Noll [1982]. The theory developed in
 this paper indicates that the expected excess demand of each firm
 may be a critical variable over which the policymaker can exercise
 control.
 IV. CONCLUSIONS
 This paper has explored the issue of market power in the
 context of markets in transferable property rights. The simple
 model developed in Section II reveals two essential points. First,
 just because a firm may have a large share of the permits, this
 does not necessarily mean it can influence the outcome in the
 permit market. Second, if a firm does have market power in the
 permit market, its effect on price (assuming that there is one firm
 with market power) varies with its excess demand for permits.
 That is to say, once the potential for market power has been
 ascertained, it is a flow-excess demand of the firm with market
 power-which determines the equilibrium.
 The importance of the flow has immediate implications for
 market design. In particular, with full knowledge of demand func-
 tions, a central authority could effectively pick the quantity of
 permits it wanted the market power firm to use through a suitable
 initial allocation. The limits to the discretion of the authority
 would be dictated by two extreme cases: pure monopsony in which
 all permits are distributed to the price takers, and pure monopoly
 in which all permits are distributed to the firm with market power.
 Of course, the more realistic situation is one in which the
 authority has, at most, only a crude estimate of the demand func-
 tions. In this case, the basic model can be applied to assess the
 possibilities for exerting market influence. The sensitivity of the
 results could be checked by varying the demand functions and
 the initial distribution of permits. This would allow the policy-
 maker to determine whether the type of market influence con-
 sidered here is likely to pose a problem in a given application.
 The formal analysis in Sections II and III indicates the range
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 of potential outcomes that might arise when firms can exert rather
 specific types of influence in markets which ration a fixed supply
 of intermediate or final goods. There are clearly other strategies
 that large firms might pursue, particularly when the market is
 just getting under way. For example, it is quite likely that the
 total number of permits issued and the pattern of distribution
 could be affected by the behavior of such firms. In the case of
 pollution rights, some firms might refuse to play the game if they
 do not care for the new set of rules. Such actions are difficult to
 model explicitly, which is why the focus here has been on the
 potential for gain within a well-defined set of rules. Even within
 this setting, further research is warranted.
 One avenue for further research would be to extend the basic
 model to the case where two or more firms have market power.
 Hahn [1981a] has examined this issue for the case of two firms
 with market power. The result on cost minimization and permit
 distribution (Proposition 1) was shown to generalize. A second
 potentially fruitful area of research would be to extend the model
 to more than one period along the lines of Stokey [1981], who
 considers a durable goods monopolist. Finally, it might be useful
 to test the theory of the basic model in a small-group experimental
 setting and determine when, and under what types of institutions,
 it is supported.
 The key result obtained here, that it is the pattern of excess
 demands that ultimately determines the extent to which any firm
 can influence the market, does not appear to be widely recognized.
 One reason is that many people feel that manipulation of such
 markets will not be a problem. For example, Tietenberg, in sur-
 veying the literature on air rights markets, expresses the view
 that "the anticompetitive effects of a TDP (transferable discharge
 permit) system are not likely to be very important in general"
 [1980, p. 414]. For several applications such as the one considered
 by DeLucia [1974] and the one considered by Hahn [1981a], the
 assumption that the market will approximate the competitive
 solution would appear to depend critically on how the institutions
 are designed. Because there is a very real possibility that several
 markets in transferable property rights could be subject to dif-
 ferent kinds of systematic manipulation, there is a need to explore
 further the ramifications of such problems in theory and appli-
 cations.
 CARNEGIE-MELLON UNIVERSITY
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